Moral perception

European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):159-175 (2010)
Abstract
Abstract: In this paper, I defend the view that we can have perceptual moral knowledge. First, I motivate the moral perception view by drawing on some examples involving perceptual knowledge of complex non-moral properties. I argue that we have little reason to think that perception of moral properties couldn't operate in much the same way that our perception of these complex non-moral properties operates. I then defend the moral perception view from two challenging objections that have yet to be adequately addressed. The first objection is that the moral perception view has implausible commitments concerning the morally blind, people who would claim not to perceive wrongness. The second objection is that the moral perception view is not really compatible with a wide range of the main candidate moral theories. I argue that the moral empiricist has plausible responses to both of these objections. I then address three residual concerns that my defense raises
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2009.00343.x
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References found in this work BETA
Value, Reality, and Desire.Graham Oddie - 2005 - Clarendon Press.
Reductive Theories of Modality.Theodore Sider - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 180-208.
Structure-Making.Kris McDaniel - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):251-274.
Moral Knowledge by Perception.Sarah McGrath - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):209–228.

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Citations of this work BETA
Perceptual Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
Towards a Rich View of Auditory Experience.E. Di Bona - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-15.
A Hard Look at Moral Perception.David Faraci - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2055-2072.
Normatively Enriched Moral Meta‐Semantics.Michael Rubin - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):386-410.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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