Privileged access, externalism, and ways of believing

Philosophical Studies 136 (3):305-318 (2007)
Authors
Andrew Cullison
State University Of New York At Fredonia
Abstract
By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access. This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access are compatible.
Keywords anti-individualism, content externalism, direct-reference theory, Millianism, privileged access
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-3255-8
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Individualism and Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.
Content and Self-Knowledge.Paul Boghossian - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.
Empty Names.David Braun - 1993 - Noûs 27 (4):449-469.

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