Particularism and presumptive reasons

Abstract
Weak particularism about reasons is the view that the normative valency of some descriptive considerations varies, while others have an invariant normative valency. A defence of this view needs to respond to arguments that a consideration cannot count in favour of any action unless it counts in favour of every action. But it cannot resort to a global holism about reasons, if it claims that there are some examples of invariant valency. This paper argues for weak particularism, and presents a framework for understanding the relationships between practical reasons. A central part of this framework is the idea that there is an important kind of reason—a 'presumptive reason'—which need not be conclusive, but which is neither pro tanto nor prima facie
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,157
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Moral Particularism and the Real World.Brad Hooker - 2008 - In Mark Norris Lance, Matjaž Potrč & Vojko Strahovnik (eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism. Routledge. pp. 12--30.
On the Intersection of Casuistry and Particularism.Gregory E. Kaebnick - 2000 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10 (4):307-322.
The Riddle of Aesthetic Principles.Vojko Strahovnik - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (33):189-208.
Putting Particularism in its Place.Joshua Gert - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):312-324.
Moral Particularism Reconfigured.Andrew Gleeson - 2007 - Philosophical Investigations 30 (4):363–380.
Particularism and Moral Theory.Garrett Cullity & Richard Holton - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76:169-209.
Moral Particularism and Scientific Practice.Brendan Larvor - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):492-507.
Particularism and Moral Theory: Particularism and Presumptive Reasons: Garrett Cullity.Garrett Cullity - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):169–190.
Agency and Policy.Garrett Cullity & Philip Gerrans - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):315–325.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-07-27

Total downloads

7 ( #521,263 of 2,163,679 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #348,043 of 2,163,679 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums