Authors
Garrett Cullity
Australian National University
Abstract
According to "the argument from discernment", sympathetic motivation is morally faulty, because it is morally undiscriminating. Sympathy can incline you to do the right thing, but it can also incline you to do the wrong thing. And if so, it is no better as a reason for doing something than any other morally arbitrary consideration. The only truly morally good form of motivation--because the only morally non-arbitrary one--involves treating an action's rightness as your reason for performing it. This paper attacks the argument from discernment and argues against its conclusion
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2006
ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00325.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,268
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785/2002 - Oxford University Press.
Creating the Kingdom of Ends.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Problems of the Self.Bernard A. O. Williams - 1973 - Cambridge University Press.
Action, Emotion And Will.A. Kenny - 1963 - Ny: Humanities Press.

View all 39 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
51 ( #207,245 of 2,444,892 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #457,287 of 2,444,892 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes