Ethics 124 (1):8-34 (2013)

Authors
Garrett Cullity
Australian National University
Abstract
Can one fact deprive another of the status of a reason for action—a status the second fact would have had, but for the presence of the first? Claims of this kind are often made, but they face substantial obstacles. This article sets out those obstacles but then argues that there are at least three different ways in which this does happen
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DOI 10.1086/671390
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