What are seemings?

Ratio 23 (3):260-274 (2010)

Authors
Andrew Cullison
State University Of New York At Fredonia
Abstract
We are all familiar with the phenomenon of a proposition seeming true. Many think that these seeming states can yield justified beliefs. Very few have seriously explored what these seeming states are. I argue that seeming states are not plausibly analyzed in terms of beliefs, partial beliefs, attractions to believe, or inclinations to believe. Given that the main candidates for analyzing seeming states are unsatisfactory, I argue for a brute view of seemings that treats seeming states as irreducible propositional attitudes.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00466.x
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References found in this work BETA

Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
Warrant: The Current Debate.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Problems of the Self.Bernard A. O. Williams - 1973 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.
Explanationist Evidentialism.Kevin McCain - 2013 - Episteme 10 (3):299-315.
What Seemings Seem to Be.Samuel A. Taylor - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):363-384.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

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