Analysis and subsumption in the behaviorism of Hull

Philosophy of Science 50 (March):96-111 (1983)
The background hypothesis of this essay is that psychological phenomena are typically explained, not by subsuming them under psychological laws, but by functional analysis. Causal subsumption is an appropriate strategy for explaining changes of state, but not for explaining capacities, and it is capacities that are the central explananda of psychology. The contrast between functional analysis and causal subsumption is illustrated, and the background hypothesis supported, by a critical reassessment of the motivational psychology of Clark Hull. I argue that Hull's work makes little sense construed along the subsumptivist lines he advocated himself, but emerges as both interesting and methodologically sound when construed as an exercise in the sort of functional analysis featured in contemporary cognitive science
Keywords Functional Analysis  Psychology  Science  Hull, C
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/289092
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,829
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Realization Relations in Metaphysics.Umut Baysan - 2015 - Minds and Machines (3):1-14.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

38 ( #137,362 of 2,178,180 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #316,504 of 2,178,180 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums