Abstract

Kantian consequentialism combines a Kantian conception of the justification of moral principles with a consequentialist principle of right action. Although the focus of this book is on defending the Kantian foundations of this new type of consequentialism, it is noteworthy that the resulting Kantian theory of value also leads to a more intuitively plausible form of consequentialism. The Kantian foundation of this new form of consequentialism does indeed entail significant constraints on the kinds of sacrifices that are morally permissible. Most centrally, the maximization of happiness cannot override the basic interests related to our rational nature. For similar reasons, on issues of social justice, this type of consequentialism is more distribution‐sensitive than classical utilitarianism. Kantian consequentialism thus supports many of the deontological intuitions and basic rights concerns that have led Kantians like Rawls to reject utilitarianism.