Zygon 55 (2):497-518 (2020)

Abstract
My critical focus in this article is on Rick Repetti's compatibilist conception of free will, and his apparent commitment to a Kantian conception of autonomy, which I argue is in direct conflict with the Buddhist doctrine of no‐self. As an alternative, I defend a conception of ego‐less agency that I believe better coheres with core Buddhist teachings. In the course of the argument, I discuss the competing conceptions of free agency and autonomy defended by Harry Frankfurt, John Martin Fischer, Christine Korsgaard, and David Velleman.
Keywords Buddhism  Christine Korsgaard  Kantian  Pudgalavadin  agency  autonomy  free will  moral responsibility  no‐self  reason‐responsiveness
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DOI 10.1111/zygo.12601
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Free Agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
Heidegger and Korsgaard on Human Reflection.Mark Okrent - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 27 (2):47-76.

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