Minds and Machines 1 (1):31-42 (1991)
In response to Michael Morris, I attempt to refute the crucial second premise of the argument, which states that the formality condition cannot be satisfied “non-stipulatively” in computational systems. I defend the view of representation urged in Meaning and Mental Representation against the charge that it makes content stipulative and therefore irrelevant to the explanation of cognition. Some other reservations are expressed
|Keywords||Mental representation computation formal condition symbols intentionality computationalism cognition|
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