Indefinites and intentional identity

Philosophical Studies 168 (2):371-395 (2014)

Authors
Samuel John Cumming
Rutgers University - New Brunswick (PhD)
Abstract
This paper investigates the truth conditions of sentences containing indefinite noun phrases, focusing on occurrences in attitude reports, and, in particular, a puzzle case due to Walter Edelberg. It is argued that indefinites semantically contribute the (thought-)object they denote, in a manner analogous to attributive definite descriptions. While there is an existential reading of attitude reports containing indefinites, it is argued that the existential quantifier is contributed by the de re interpretation of the indefinite (as the de re reading adds existential quantification to the interpretation of definites on Kaplan’s analysis)
Keywords Indefinites  Intentional identity  Attitude reports  Truth conditions  Referential/attributive  de re/de dicto
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0131-9
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
The Reference Book.John Hawthorne & David Manley - 2012 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Dynamic Semantics.Karen S. Lewis - 2017 - Oxford Handbooks Online.
Co‐Identification and Fictional Names.Manuel García‐Carpintero - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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