Philosophy of Science 44 (June):269-87 (1977)
The purpose of this paper is to set forth a sense in which programs can and do explain behavior, and to distinguish from this a number of senses in which they do not. Once we are tolerably clear concerning the sort of explanatory strategy being employed, two rather interesting facts emerge; (1) though it is true that programs are "internally represented," this fact has no explanatory interest beyond the mere fact that the program is executed; (2) programs which are couched in information processing terms may have an explanatory interest for a given range of behavior which is independent of physiological explanations of the same range of behavior
|Keywords||Behavior Computer Explanation Physiology Program Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology.J. A. Fodor - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63.
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