Abstract

It cannot be denied that Hilary Putnam's philosophical views have been the source of much discussion and debate in recent and in not-so-recent years. Thus, critical exchanges with Putnam abound, as do interpretive papers that examine the significance of Putnam's views in specific areas of philosophical inquiry. However, what is less often remarked upon is the contribution of Putnam's thinking to a certain metaphilosophical question, the question of what problems should even be addressed by philosophical inquiry. In the following discussion, I examine how Putnam addresses this particular metaphilosophical question. Central to this examination is the identification of a dialectical method in Putnam's thinking. This method is responsible ultimately for the exposure of unintelligibility in philosophy through the revelation of an illusion of thought to which, it is claimed, much philosophical inquiry is subject. This illusion is the misguided assumption on the part of the philosopher that it is possible to engage in reflection from the perspective of a metaphysical standpoint. I argue that this illusion comes about through an urge to theorize in philosophy, specifically through an urge to pursue scientific theorizing in philosophy. Finally, I discuss how Putnam looks to the work of Wittgenstein for a method of overcoming philosophical unintelligibility, a method that also enables the philosopher to make a significant contribution to the explanation of philosophical problems.