Informal Logic 22 (2) (2002)

Abstract
lt is now commonplace in fallacy inquiry for many of the traditional informal fallacies to be viewed as reasonable or nonfallacious modes of argument. Central to this evaluative shift has been the attempt to examine traditional fallacies within their wider contexts of use. However, this pragmatic turn in fallacy evaluation is still in its infancy. The true potential of a contextual approach in the evaluation of the fallacies is yet to be explored. I examine how, in the context of scientific inquiry, certain traditional fallacies function by conferring epistemic gains upon inquiry. Specifically, I argue that these fallacies facilitate the progression of inquiry, particularly in the initial stages ofinquiry when the epistemic context is one of uncertainty. The conception of these fallacies that emerges is that of heuristics of reasoning in contexts of epistemic uncertainty
Keywords argument from analogy, argument from ignorance, bovine spongiform encephalopathy, context, Douglas Walton, epistemic uncertainty, fallaciousness/nonfallaciousness and scientific inquiry
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,992
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Fallacies.C. L. Hamblin - 1970 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 160:492-492.
What is Reasoning? What is an Argument?Douglas N. Walton - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (8):399-419.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Fallacies.Robert J. Fogelin & Timothy J. Duggan - 1987 - Argumentation 1 (3):255-262.
Bayesian Informal Logic and Fallacy.Kevin Korb - 2004 - Informal Logic 24 (1):41-70.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-11-24

Total views
52 ( #199,944 of 2,439,417 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #282,750 of 2,439,417 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes