Social cognition is not a special case, and the dark matter is more extensive than recognized

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):415-416 (2013)
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Abstract

The target article's approach is applauded, but it is suggested that the may be much larger than even the current authors suspect. Cartesian and mechanistic assumptions infuse not only the discipline of cognitive psychology, but all societal accounts of the person. A switch to dynamical accounts in which lawfulness is observed within a given systemic context is suggested

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Fred Cummins
University College Dublin

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