Semantics for Nominalists

ProtoSociology 31:38-42 (2014)
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Abstract

Nominalists should give up on one of Frege’s semantic tenets, and adopt an account on which the truth-value of a sentence depends on the senses, rather than the referents, of its syntactic constituents. That way, sentences like ‘2+2=4’ and ‘Hamlet did not exist’ might be true, without components like ‘2’ and ‘Hamlet’ having a referent.

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Samuel John Cumming
University of California, Los Angeles

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