Synthese 120 (2):271-294 (1999)

Authors
David Cunning
University of Iowa
Abstract
In Intentionality and other works, John Searle establishes himself as a leading defender of the view that consciousness of what one is doing is always a component of one'€™s action. In this paper I focus on problems with Searle'€™s view to establish that there are actions in which the agent is not at all aware of what she is doing. I argue that any theory that misses this sort of action keeps us from important insights into autonomy, self-knowledge and responsibility
Keywords Action  Agency  Consciousness  Metaphysics  Searle, J
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DOI 10.1023/A:1005192006642
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References found in this work BETA

Intentionality and the Phenomenology of Action.Jerome C. Wakefield & Hubert L. Dreyfus - 1991 - In Ernest Lepore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Response: The Background of Intentionality and Action.John R. Searle - 1991 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 293.

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Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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