Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (2):177–189 (2005)
In this paper, we explore Peirce's work for insights into a theory of learning and cognition for education. Our focus for this exploration is Peirce's paper The Fixation of Belief (FOB), originally published in 1877 in Popular Science Monthly. We begin by examining Peirce's assertion that the study of logic is essential for understanding thought and reasoning. We explicate Peirce's view of the nature of reasoning itself—the characteristic guiding principles or ‘habits of mind’ that underlie acts of inference, the dimensions of and interaction between doubt and belief, and his four methods of resolving or ‘fixing’ belief (i.e., tenacity, authority, a priori, and experimentation). The four methods are then juxtaposed against current models of teaching and learning such as constructivism, schema theory, situated cognition, and inquiry learning. Finally, we discuss Peirce's modes of inference as they relate educationally to the resolution of doubt and beliefs and offer an example of belief resolution from an experienced teacher in a professional development environment.
|Keywords||Charles S. Peirce Education|
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References found in this work BETA
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce.Charles S. Peirce - 1931 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Toward a Theory of Instruction.Jerome S. Bruner - 1966 - Cambridge: Mass., Belknap Press of Harvard University.
Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life.Joseph Brent - 1993 - History and Philosophy of Logic 14 (2):531-538.
Citations of this work BETA
Diagrammatic Reasoning and Hypostatic Abstraction in Statistics Education.Arthur Bakker - 2007 - Semiotica 2007 (164):9-29.
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