Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)

Authors
Joe Cunningham
Oxford University
Abstract
The primary focus of Susanne Mantel’s excellent 'Determined by Reasons' is to develop a distinctive abilities-based account of acting in response to normative reasons, one which is clearly modelled on extant ability-theoretic accounts of knowledge. This review sketches Mantel’s account and raises a worry: that the account fails to characterise the sort of abilities constitutively involved in responding to reasons because it allows that agents can act for the reason that p even if their belief that p is not accessible to conscious reasoning.
Keywords Normative Reasons  Motivating Reasons  Acting for Reasons
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