Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):465 – 486 (2002)
The central purpose of this essay is to consider some of the more prominent reasons why realists have rejected the Humean theory of motivation. I shall argue that these reasons are not persuasive, and that there is nothing about being a moral realist that should make us suspicious of Humeanism.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Weak Motivational Internalism, Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do.Jesse Steinberg - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (sup1):1-24.
The Structure of Instrumental Practical Reasoning.Christian Miller - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):1–40.
Similar books and articles
The Humean Theory of Motivation and its Critics.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2008 - In A Companion to Hume. Wiley-Blackwell.
Reasons, Value, and Particular Agents: Normative Relevance Without Motivational Internalism.William J. FitzPatrick - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):285-318.
Desiring at Will and Humeanism in Practical Reason.Yonatan Shemmer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (3):265-294.
Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation.Jonathan Dancy - 1995 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:1-18.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads53 ( #97,477 of 2,158,398 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #64,994 of 2,158,398 )
How can I increase my downloads?