Reconciling realism with humeanism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):465 – 486 (2002)
Abstract
The central purpose of this essay is to consider some of the more prominent reasons why realists have rejected the Humean theory of motivation. I shall argue that these reasons are not persuasive, and that there is nothing about being a moral realist that should make us suspicious of Humeanism.
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DOI 10.1080/713659531
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Motivational Internalism.Christian Miller - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):233-255.
Motivation in Agents.Christian Miller - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):222–266.
Pure Cognitivism and Beyond.Attila Tanyi - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):331-348.
The Structure of Instrumental Practical Reasoning.Christian Miller - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):1–40.

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