Authors
Margaret Cuonzo
Long Island University, Brooklyn
Abstract
In this essay I will examine the role that intuition plays in Russell’s paradox; showing how different approaches to intuition will license different treatments of the paradox. In addition, I will argue for a specific approach to the paradox, one that follows from the most plausible account of intuition. On this account, intuitions, though fallible, have epistemic import. In addition, the intuitions involved in paradoxes point to something wrong with concept that leads to paradox. In the case of Russell’s paradox, this is an ambiguity in the notion of a class.
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