Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):850-877 (2018)

Authors
Devin Sanchez Curry
West Virginia University
Abstract
Many psychologists studying lay belief attribution and behavior explanation cite Donald Davidson in support of their assumption that people construe beliefs as inner causes. But Davidson’s influential argument is unsound; there are no objective grounds for the intuition that the folk construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior. Indeed, recent experimental work by Ian Apperly, Bertram Malle, Henry Wellman, and Tania Lombrozo provides an empirical framework that accords well with Gilbert Ryle’s alternative thesis that the folk construe beliefs as patterns of living that contextualize behavior.
Keywords Belief  Ryle  Davidson  Mindreading  Attribution Theory  Folk Psychology
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Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1080/09515089.2018.1452197
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.

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Citations of this work BETA

Interpretivism and Norms.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):905-930.
Street Smarts.Devin Sanchez Curry - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.

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