Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):345 – 359 (1983)
Abstract |
Two claims the present author has made about Frege's philosophy are defended against Michael Dummett's criticisms (The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy and ?Objectivity and Reality in Lotze and Frege?, this journal, 1982). The claim that Frege was concerned primarily with epistemological problems rather than with the theory of meaning, and the claim (this journal, 1978) that the ascription of Wirklichkeit to Thoughts is evidence of Frege's realism, are clarified and defended. Dummett's own characterization of Frege's realism is considered and rejected
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DOI | 10.1080/00201748308602002 |
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References found in this work BETA
Frege, Sense and Mathematical Knowledge.Gregory Currie - 1982 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):5 – 19.
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Citations of this work BETA
Psychologism and Anti-Realism.Karen Green - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):488 – 500.
The Anthropology of Hermann Lotze (1817-1881): A Comparative Approach.Hendrik Vanmassenhove - unknown
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