Material constitution, the neuroscience of consciousness, and the temporality of experience

In Steven Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a science and theory. pp. 433-444 (2015)
Authors
Benjamin L. Curtis
Nottingham Trent University
Abstract
In this paper I argue that if a completed neuroscience of consciousness is to be attained, we must give the synchronic and diachronic application conditions for brain states and phenomenal states. I argue that, due to the temporal nature of our experiences, such states must be viewed as being temporally extended events, and illustrate how to give such application conditions using examples of other temporally extended events. However, I also raise some difficulties for the project of giving application conditions for brain states and phenomenal states and suggest these as challenges for further philosophical work.
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