Past Facts and the Nature of History

Journal of the Philosophy of History 16 (2):179-206 (2021)
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Abstract

We defend a realist account of history: past facts are discoveries not creations. We show how ‘moderate’ realists, who admit the critical role of perspective, while insisting on history’s metaphysical independence from historians, can accommodate Paul Roth’s arguments in favor of irrealism. Moreover, our position is consistent with a dynamic past: as history unfurls past events gain new properties. Realism is necessary, we argue, to capture substantive disputes within history. It also grounds history’s reflexivity: the point of the continual re-examination of history turns in part on there being mind-independent past facts to be had.

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Author Profiles

Adrian Currie
Cambridge University
Daniel G. Swaim
University of Pennsylvania

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