Cognition:104513 (forthcoming)

Authors
Tania Lombrozo
University of California, Berkeley
Corey Cusimano
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
When faced with a dilemma between believing what is supported by an impartial assessment of the evidence (e.g., that one's friend is guilty of a crime) and believing what would better fulfill a moral obligation (e.g., that the friend is innocent), people often believe in line with the latter. But is this how people think beliefs ought to be formed? We addressed this question across three studies and found that, across a diverse set of everyday situations, people treat moral considerations as legitimate grounds for believing propositions that are unsupported by objective, evidence-based reasoning. We further document two ways in which moral considerations affect how people evaluate others' beliefs. First, the moral value of a belief affects the evidential threshold required to believe, such that morally beneficial beliefs demand less evidence than morally risky beliefs. Second, people sometimes treat the moral value of a belief as an independent justification for belief, and on that basis, sometimes prescribe evidentially poor beliefs to others. Together these results show that, in the folk ethics of belief, morality can justify and demand motivated reasoning.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104513
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,700
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.
Epistemic Partiality in Friendship.Sarah Stroud - 2006 - Ethics 116 (3):498-524.

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Folk Theories in the Moral Domain.Sara Gottlieb & Tania Lombrozo - 2018 - In Kurt Gray & Jesse Graham (eds.), Atlas of Moral Psychology. New York: Guilford.
Aspects of Folk Morality: Objectivism and Relativism.Hagop Sarkissian - 2016 - In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. London, UK: pp. 212-224.
Devotion, Diversity, and Reasoning: Religion and Medical Ethics.Michael D. Dahnke - 2015 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 12 (4):709-722.
The Natural Foundations of Religion.Mark Collier - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):665-680.
Beliefs as Inner Causes: The (Lack of) Evidence.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):850-877.
The Folk Epistemology of Delusions.Dominic Murphy - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):19-22.
Morality as What One Really Desires.Arnold Zuboff - 1995 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1):142-164.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-01-19

Total views
16 ( #629,145 of 2,432,322 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #44,512 of 2,432,322 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes