Orientamento al bene e trascendenza dal sé: Il problema dell'oggettivitá dei valori in Max Scheler

Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 40 (4):39-62 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The German phenomenologist Max Scheler, commonly considered one of the most important exponents of value objectivism, does not claim an “absolute” value objectivism, as often asserted. The values are objecttive towards the will of the subject, not towards the creative act of loving. This presupposes a radical new conception of the value. According to Scheler, in fact, the values are no qualities to be attributed to the perceived object but the very first thing grasped on a phenomenon, i.e. the “first messenger” (erste Bote) of the phenomenon: the value is what orients the formation and development of the experience. This paper proposes to deal with the problem of the value objectivism in relation to the self-transcendence and to the self-realization of the person. The value objectivism should be measured by its faculty to orient the act through which a person detaches himself from the proper factual self. The “Good” isn‟t therefore related to an ideal transcendent object, but to the act to transcend the proper self in a creative way. The fundamental thesis is that the personal identity constitutes itself only in a critical distancing from the self. This concrete act of self-transcending cannot be understood merely in the sense of the self-interpretation – of the “strong evaluations” of Charles Taylor – but requires also the presence of the exemplarity of the other.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-18

Downloads
314 (#79,625)

6 months
89 (#67,264)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Guido Cusinato
Università degli Studi di Verona

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references