Ryle's Paradox and the Concept of Exemplification

Grazer Philosophische Studien 10 (2):65-71 (1980)
Abstract
Gilbert Ryle has argued that Plato's Theory of Forms is a "logically vicious" doctrine because it's fundamental concept of exemplification leads to a vicious infinite regress. David Armstrong and Alan Donagan have agreed with Ryle. After making Ryle's argument logically explicit, I show the exemplification regress is illusory. Exemplification is a genuine universal alongside other relations; there is nothing paradoxical in its being exemplified over and over and over ... Platonism can define logical properties of this relation but not the relation itself, however.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy
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DOI 10.5840/gps1980107
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