Subjectivity, objectivity, and theories of reference in Evans' theory of thought

Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy (1999)
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Abstract

This paper explores some problems with Gareth Evans’s theory of the fundamental and non-fundamental levels of thought [1]. I suggest a way to reconceive the levels of thought that overcomes these problems. But, first, why might anyone who was not already struck by Evans’s remarkable theory care about these issues? What’s at stake here?

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2009-01-28

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Adrian Cussins
Universidad Nacional de Colombia

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