Phables (2020)

Simon Cushing
University of Michigan - Flint
An extended example illustrating various theories of personal identity and imagining how duplicates would confront the argument that neither of them is identical with the original.
Keywords personal identity  derek parfit  david lewis  john locke  fission cases  teletransporter  philosophical fiction
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