Analysis 79 (1):25-34 (2019)

Authors
Brian Cutter
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
One of the most important objections to sense data theory comes from the phenomenon of indeterminate perception, as when an object in the periphery of one’s visual field looks red without looking to have any determinate shade of red. As sense data are supposed to have precisely the properties that sensibly appear to us, sense data theory evidently has the implausible consequence that a sense datum can have a determinable property without having any of its determinates. In this article, I show that a parallel objection applies to standard forms of colour relationism. In light of the phenomenon of indeterminate perception, the colour relationist must either reject intuitively obvious claims about the determinate–determinable structure of colour space or reject the plausible and widely accepted principle that nothing can have a determinable without having one of its determinates.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/any032
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.

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Citations of this work BETA

Science, substance and spatial appearances.Thomas Raleigh - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2097-2114.
Color and a Priori Knowledge.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):293-315.
Modeling Mental Qualities.Andrew Y. Lee - forthcoming - Philosophical Review.
Perceptual Illusionism.Brian Cutter - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.

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