Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256):423-433 (2014)

Authors
Michael Tye
University of Texas at Austin
Brian Cutter
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
In this paper, we defend the representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness against a recent objection due to Hilla Jacobson, who charges representationalism with a failure to explain the role of pain in rationalizing certain forms of behavior. In rough outline, her objection is that the representationalist is unable to account for the rationality of certain acts, such as the act of taking pain killers, which are aimed at getting rid of the experience of pain rather than its intentional object. If representationalism were true, she claims, then the act of taking pain killers would be just as irrational as the act of a ruler who responds to bad tidings by killing the messenger. This paper aims to show that these charges are mistaken
Keywords Pain  Representationalism  Reasons  Consciousness
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqu025
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References found in this work BETA

What Makes Pains Unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
Mental Paint and Mental Latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.
Review: Précis of Ten Prolems of Consciousness. [REVIEW]Michael Tye - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):649 - 656.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Pain.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Why Take Painkillers?David Bain - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):462-490.
Reasons and Theories of Sensory Affect.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2019 - In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and Deviance. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 27-59.
Not Only a Messenger: Towards an Attitudinal‐Representational Theory of Pain.Hilla Jacobson - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):382-408.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

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