Authors
Brian Cutter
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
This paper defends a non-reductive realist view of the sensible qualities—roughly, the view that the sensible qualities are really instantiated by the external objects of perception, and not reducible to response-independent physical properties or response-dependent relational properties. I begin by clarifying and motivating the non-reductive realist view. I then consider some familiar difficulties for the view. Addressing these difficulties leads to the development and defence of a general theory, inspired by Russellian Monist theories of consciousness, of how the sensible qualities relate to physical reality. I conclude by showing how this theory, which I call ‘Secondary Quality Russellian Monism’, resolves the most significant difficulties for the non-reductive realist view of the sensible qualities.
Keywords Russellian Monism  Color  Secondary Qualities  Perception  Consciousness
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017, 2018
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1080/00048402.2017.1298141
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,811
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.

View all 54 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12).
Qualities and the Galilean View.Michelle Liu - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (9-10):147-162.
Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.
On Debunking Color Realism.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - forthcoming - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Evolutionary Debunking Arguments. Routledge.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Physicalism and the Subjectivity of Secondary Qualities.Janet Levin - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (4):400-411.
Thomas Aquinas, Perceptual Resemblance, Categories, and the Reality of Secondary Qualities.Paul Symington - 2011 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 85:237-252.
A Theory of Secondary Qualities.Robert Pasnau - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):568-591.
Concepts of Secondary Qualities.James Hill - 1998 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 5 (Supplement):91-98.
Leibniz on the Metaphysics of Color.Stephen Puryear - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):319-346.
Some Problems of Perceptions.Douglas Lewis - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (March):100-113.
Time, Unity, and Conscious Experience.Michal Klincewicz - 2013 - Dissertation, CUNY Graduate Center
What the Mind-Independence of Color Requires.Peter Ross - 2017 - In Marcos Silva (ed.), How Colours Matter to Philosophy. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 137-158.
What is Russellian Monism?Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):67–95.
Aesthetic Realism and Emotional Qualities of Music.Malcolm Budd - 2005 - British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (2):111-122.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-03-07

Total views
129 ( #85,669 of 2,463,156 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #119,708 of 2,463,156 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes