Moral Responsibility, Luck, and Compatibilism

Erkenntnis 84 (1):193-214 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I defend a version of compatibilism against luck-related objections. After introducing the types of luck that some take to be problematic for moral responsibility, I consider and respond to two recent attempts to show that compatibilism faces the same problem of luck that libertarianism faces—present luck. I then consider a different type of luck—constitutive luck—and provide a new solution to this problem. One upshot of the present discussion is a reason to prefer a history-sensitive compatibilist account over a purely nonhistorical structuralist account.

Similar books and articles

Luck and history‐sensitive compatibilism.Neil Levy - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):237-251.
Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (1):1-21.
A problem for moral luck.Steven D. Hales - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2385-2403.
Moral and epistemic luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):1–25.
Moral and Epistemic Luck.Andrew Latus - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:149-172.
Moral luck, control, and the bases of desert.David W. Concepcion - 2002 - Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):455-461.
Moral Luck Defended.Nathan Hanna - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):683-698.
Getting Moral Luck Right.Lee John Whittington - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):654-667.
Moral and Epistemic Luck.Andrew Latus - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:149-172.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-11-07

Downloads
562 (#33,433)

6 months
210 (#13,090)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Taylor W. Cyr
Samford University

Citations of this work

Manipulation and constitutive luck.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2381-2394.
Free Will and Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2022 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), A Companion to Free Will. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 378-392.
Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):165-183.
The inescapability of moral luck.Taylor W. Cyr - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):302-310.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

A treatise of human nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1969 - Harmondsworth,: Penguin Books. Edited by Ernest Campbell Mossner.
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

View all 60 references / Add more references