Erkenntnis 84 (1):193-214 (2019)

Authors
Taylor W. Cyr
Samford University
Abstract
In this paper, I defend a version of compatibilism against luck-related objections. After introducing the types of luck that some take to be problematic for moral responsibility, I consider and respond to two recent attempts to show that compatibilism faces the same problem of luck that libertarianism faces—present luck. I then consider a different type of luck—constitutive luck—and provide a new solution to this problem. One upshot of the present discussion is a reason to prefer a history-sensitive compatibilist account over a purely nonhistorical structuralist account.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-017-9954-7
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):165-183.
Manipulation and constitutive luck.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2381-2394.
The Inescapability of Moral Luck.Taylor W. Cyr - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):302-310.

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