Why Compatibilists Must Be Internalists

The Journal of Ethics 23 (4):473-484 (2019)
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Abstract

Some compatibilists are internalists. On their view, whether an agent is morally responsible for an action depends only on her psychological structure at that time. Other compatibilists are externalists. On their view, an agent’s history can make a difference as to whether or not she is morally responsible. In response to worries about manipulation, some internalists have claimed that compatibilism requires internalism. Recently, Alfred Mele has argued that this internalist response is untenable. The aim of this paper is to vindicate the claim that compatibilism requires internalism, showing where Mele’s argument goes wrong along the way.

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Taylor W. Cyr
Samford University

Citations of this work

Epistemic Autonomy and Externalism.J. Adam Carter - 2021 - In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. New York, NY: Routledge.
The inescapability of moral luck.Taylor W. Cyr - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):302-310.
Initial Design, Manipulation, and Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer - 2021 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (2):255-270.
Natural Compatibilists Should Be Theological Compatibilists.Taylor Cyr - 2022 - In Leigh Vicens & Peter Furlong (eds.), Theological Determinism: New Perspectives. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 119-132.

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References found in this work

Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
Autonomous Agents: From Self Control to Autonomy.Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.

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