Feeling Good: Integrating the Psychology and Epistemology of Moral Intuition and Emotion


Authors
Hossein Dabbagh
Institute for Cognitive Science Studies
Abstract
Is the epistemology of moral intuitions compatible with admitting a role for emotion? I argue in this paper that moral intuitions and emotions can be partners without creating an epistemic threat. I start off by offering some empirical findings to weaken Singer’s (and Greene’s and Haidt’s) debunking argument against moral intuition, which treat emotions as a distorting factor. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the standard contrast between intuition and emotion is a mistake. Moral intuitions and emotions are not contestants if we construe moral intuition as non-doxastic intellectual seeming and emotion as a non-doxastic perceptual-like state. This will show that emotions support, rather than distort, the epistemic standing of moral intuitions.
Keywords Moral Intuition, Emotion, Seemings, Non-Doxastic, Singer, Greene, Haidt
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