Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):117-132 (2018)

Hossein Dabbagh
Institute for Cognitive Science Studies
In this paper, I introduce and elucidate what seems to me the best understanding of moral intuition with reference to the intellectual seeming account. First, I will explain Bengson’s quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuition in terms of intellectual seeming. I then shift from philosophical intuition to moral intuition and will delineate Audi’s doxastic account of moral intuition to argue that the intellectual seeming account of intuition is superior to the doxastic account of intuition. Next, I argue that we can apply our understanding of the intellectual seeming account of philosophical intuition to the moral intuition. To the extent that we can argue for the intellectual seeming account of philosophical intuition, we can have the intellectual seeming account of moral intuition.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Moral Intuition  Seeming
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ISBN(s) 1333-1108
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