Why Should Anybody Be a Naturalist?

Philo 7 (2):138-145 (2004)
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Abstract

Michael Rea has argued that philosophical naturalists cannot coherently regard the adoption of naturalism as a “research program” as more epistemically rational than the adoption of the alternatives, like intuitionism or supernatural theism. I show that Rea’s argument fails by overlooking several species of epistemic reasons for adopting research programs.

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