The notion of a recognitional concept and other confusions

Philosophical Studies 150 (1):139 - 160 (2010)
Abstract
The notion of a recognitional concept (RC) is stated precisely and shown to be unrelated to the proper notion of a perceptually based concept, defining of concept empiricism. More fundamentally, it is argued that the notion of an RC does not reflect a potentially sensible candidate theory of concepts at all and therefore ought to be abandoned from concept-theoretical discourse. In the later parts of the paper, it is shown independently of these points that Fodor's attacks on RCs are in all central respects based on fallacies and confusions. Thus, even if the notion of an RC were one worth defending, it could not be threatened by Fodor's attacks on it. Throughout the paper, I aim at clarification regarding the logical relations between various concept-theoretical options
Keywords Concepts  Recognitional concepts  Concept empiricism  Causal theories of content  Prototype theory  Fodor
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9398-2
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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.

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