Oxford University Press (2008)
Barry Dainton presents a fascinating new account of the self, the key to which is experiential or phenomenal continuity. Provided our mental life continues we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic physical alterations, or even moving from one body to another. It was this fact that led John Locke to conclude that a credible account of our persistence conditions - an account which reflects how we actually conceive of ourselves - should be framed in terms of mental rather than material continuity. But mental continuity comes in different forms. Most of Locke's contemporary followers agree that our continued existence is secured by psychological continuity, which they take to be made up of memories, beliefs, intentions, personality traits, and the like. Dainton argues that that a better and more believable account can be framed in terms of the sort of continuity we find in our streams of consciousness from moment to moment. Why? Simply because provided this continuity is not lost - provided our streams of consciousness flow on - we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic psychological alterations. Phenomenal continuity seems to provide a more reliable guide to our persistence than any form of continuity. The Phenomenal Self is a full-scale defence and elaboration of this premise. The first task is arriving at an adequate understanding of phenomenal unity and continuity. This achieved, Dainton turns to the most pressing problem facing any experience-based approach: losses of consciousness. How can we survive them? He shows how the problem can be solved in a satisfactory manner by construing ourselves as systems of experiential capacities. He then moves on to explore a range of further issues. How simple can a self be? How are we related to our bodies? Is our persistence an all-or-nothing affair? Do our minds consist of parts which could enjoy an independent existence? Is it metaphysically intelligible to construe ourselves as systems of capacities? The book concludes with a novel treatment of fission and fusion
|Keywords||Self (Philosophy Phenomenalism Phenomenology Self|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$20.00 used (85% off) $37.10 new (72% off) $130.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BD450.D263 2008|
|ISBN(s)||9780199288847 0199288844 9780199692248|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime.Cody Gilmore - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1224-1254.
The Sense of Diachronic Personal Identity.Stan Klein - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):791-811.
Is There a Conservative Solution to the Many Thinkers Problem?David Mark Kovacs - 2010 - Ratio 23 (3):275-290.
Similar books and articles
Hume and Husserl: The Problem of the Continuity or Temporalization of Consciousness.Louis N. Sandowsky - 2006 - International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (181):59-74.
Two Conceptions of Psychological Continuity.Marc Slors - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):61 – 80.
Higher-Order Consciousness and Phenomenal Space: Reply to Meehan.Barry F. Dainton - 2004 - Psyche 10 (1).
The Continuity of Consciousness.Oliver Rashbrook - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):611-640.
Phenomenal Continuity and the Bridge Problem.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):289–296.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads53 ( #97,516 of 2,158,795 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #132,835 of 2,158,795 )
How can I increase my downloads?