The self and the phenomenal

Ratio 17 (4):365-89 (2004)
Abstract
As is widely appreciated and easily demonstrated, the notion that we are essentially experiential (or conscious) beings has a good deal of appeal; what is less obvious, and more controversial, is whether it is possible to devise a viable account of the self along such lines within the confines of a broadly naturalistic metaphysical framework. There are many avenues to explore, but here I confine myself to outlining the case for one particular approach. I suggest that we should think of ourselves (or our essential cores) as being composed of experience-producing systems, and that such systems belong to the same self when they have the capacity to contribute to unified streams of consciousness. The viability of this proposal rests in turn on a particular conception of the structure of consciousness, both at and over time; this conception is defended in the first part of the paper..
Keywords Consciousness  Metaphysics  Phenomena  Self  Substance
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2004.00261.x
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References found in this work BETA
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Dover Publications.
Two Concepts of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Human Beings.Mark Johnston - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (February):59-83.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Phenomenologically Manifest.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):115-136.

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Nonphenomenal Consciousness.Eric Lormand - 1996 - Noûs 30 (2):242-61.
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