A normatively adequate credal reductivism

Synthese 191 (10):2301-2313 (2014)
Authors
Justin M. Dallmann
University of Southern California
Abstract
It is a prevalent, if not popular, thesis in the metaphysics of belief that facts about an agent’s beliefs depend entirely upon facts about that agent’s underlying credal state. Call this thesis ‘credal reductivism’ and any view that endorses this thesis a ‘credal reductivist view’. An adequate credal reductivist view will accurately predict both when belief occurs and which beliefs are held appropriately, on the basis of credal facts alone. Several well-known—and some lesser known—objections to credal reductivism turn on the inability of standard credal reductivist views to get the latter, normative, results right. This paper presents and defends a novel credal reductivist view according to which belief is a type of “imprecise credence” that escapes these objections by including an extreme credence of 1
Keywords Belief  Credal reductivism  Imprecise credences  Correctness   The lottery paradox  The preface paradox
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0402-9
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Philosophical Papers Vol. II.Lewis David - 1986 - Oxford University Press.

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Vague Credence.Aidan Lyon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3931-3954.

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