Logos and Episteme (4):399-406 (2013)

Authors
Simon D'Alfonso
University of Melbourne (PhD)
Abstract
The KK principle is typically rejected in externalist accounts of knowledge. However, a standard general argument for this rejection is in need of a supportive explication. In a recent paper, Samir Okasha argues that the standard externalist argument in question is fallacious. In this paper I start off with some critical discussion of Okasha’s analysis before suggesting an alternative way in which an externalist might successfully present such a case. I then further explore this issue via a look at how Fred Dretske’s externalist epistemology, one of the exemplifying accounts, can explain failure of the KK principle.
Keywords knowledge  externalism  reliabilism  KK principle  Fred Dretske
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ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme2013442
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