Philosophical Studies 139 (3):423 - 440 (2008)
This paper distinguishes revolutionary fictionalism from other forms of fictionalism and also from other philosophical views. The paper takes fictionalism about mathematical objects and fictionalism about scientific unobservables as illustrations. The paper evaluates arguments that purport to show that this form of fictionalism is incoherent on the grounds that there is no tenable distinction between believing a sentence and taking the fictionalist's distinctive attitude to that sentence. The argument that fictionalism about mathematics is ‘comically immodest’ is also evaluated. In place of those arguments, an argument against fictionalism about abstract objects of any kind is presented in the last section. This argument takes the form of a trilemma against the fictionalist.
|Keywords||Fictionalism Belief Acceptance|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
Citations of this work BETA
The Kantian Moral Hazard Argument for Religious Fictionalism.Christopher Jay - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (3):207-232.
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