Internal constraints for phenomenal externalists: a structure matching theory

Synthese 200 (5):1-29 (2022)
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Abstract

We motivate five constraints on theorizing about sensory experience. We then propose a novel form of naturalistic intentionalism that succeeds where other theories fail by satisfying all of these constraints. On the proposed theory, which we call structure matching tracking intentionalism, brains states track determinables. Internal structural features of those states select determinates of those determinables for presentation in experience. We argue that this theory is distinctively well-positioned to both explain internal-phenomenal structural correlations and accord external features a role in fixing phenomenology. In addition, we use the theory to shed light on how one comes to experience “missing shades”.

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Author Profiles

Bryce Dalbey
University of Texas at Austin
Bradford Saad
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Digital suffering: why it's a problem and how to prevent it.Bradford Saad & Adam Bradley - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Harmony in a panpsychist world.Bradford Saad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-24.

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References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Phenomenal Structuralism.David J. Chalmers - 2012 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Constructing the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 412-422.

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