Nominalism, Trivialist Platonism and Benacerraf's dilemma

Analysis 74 (2):224-231 (2014)
Authors
David Liggins
University of Manchester
Chris Daly
University of Manchester
Abstract
In his stimulating new book The Construction of Logical Space , Agustín Rayo offers a new account of mathematics, which he calls ‘Trivialist Platonism’. In this article, we take issue with Rayo’s case for Trivialist Platonism and his claim that the view overcomes Benacerraf’s dilemma. Our conclusion is that Rayo has not shown that Trivialist Platonism has any advantage over nominalism
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anu038
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Could Nothing Matter?F. MacBride - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):125-135.

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