Dialectica 66 (1):69-91 (2012)
Revelation is the thesis that having an experience that instantiates some phenomenal property puts us in a position to know the nature or essence of that property. It is widely held that although Revelation is prima facie plausible, it is inconsistent with physicalism, and, in particular, with the claim that phenomenal properties are physical properties. I outline the standard argument for the incompatibility of Revelation and physicalism and compare it with the Knowledge Argument. By doing so, I hope to show that on various plausible interpretations of Revelation it is in fact consistent with physicalism. Moreover, there is a robust reading of Revelation that a posteriori physicalists can, and should, accept
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References found in this work BETA
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts.Michael Tye - 2009 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Conceptual Instability and the New Epistemic Possibility.Raamy Majeed - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):613-627.
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