Scepticism and the Interpreter

Philosophical Papers 29 (2):61-72 (2000)
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Abstract

Abstract This paper defends an argument from interpretation against the possibility of massive error. The argument shares many important features with Donald Davidson's famous argument, but also key differences. I defend the argument against claims that it begs the question against scepticism and that it leaves the sceptic with an obvious means of escape

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Damian Cox
Bond University

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Skepticism and interpretation.Kirk Ludwig - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):317-339.
To interpret, or to be omniscient.Wai-Hung Wong - 1993 - Philosophical Papers 22 (3):189-198.

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