Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)

Authors
Justin D'Ambrosio
Australian National University
Abstract
The many-property problem has traditionally been taken to show that the adverbial theory of perception is untenable. This paper first shows that several widely accepted views concerning the nature of perception---including both representational and non-representational views---likewise face the many-property problem. It then presents a solution to the many-property problem for these views, but goes on to show how this solution can be adapted to provide a novel, fully compositional solution to the many-property problem for adverbialism. Thus, with respect to the many-property problem, adverbialism and several widely accepted views in the philosophy of perception are on a par, and the problem is solved.
Keywords adverbialism  perception  intensional transitive verbs  monotonicity inferences  representationalism
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