The many-property problem is your problem, too

Philosophical Studies 178 (3):811-832 (2021)
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Abstract

The many-property problem has traditionally been taken to show that the adverbial theory of perception is untenable. This paper first shows that several widely accepted views concerning the nature of perception---including both representational and non-representational views---likewise face the many-property problem. It then presents a solution to the many-property problem for these views, but goes on to show how this solution can be adapted to provide a novel, fully compositional solution to the many-property problem for adverbialism. Thus, with respect to the many-property problem, adverbialism and several widely accepted views in the philosophy of perception are on a par, and the problem is solved.

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Author's Profile

Justin D'Ambrosio
University of St. Andrews

References found in this work

The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela A. Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.

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