In Stephen H. Daniel (ed.), New Interpretations of Berkeley's Thought. Humanity Books (2008)

Stephen H. Daniel
Texas A&M University
For Berkeley, minds are not Cartesian spiritual substances because they cannot be said to exist (even if only conceptually) abstracted from their activities. Similarly, Berkeley's notion of mind differs from Locke's in that, for Berkeley, minds are not abstract substrata in which ideas inhere. Instead, Berkeley redefines what it means for the mind to be a substance in a way consistent with the Stoic logic of 17th century Ramists on which Leibniz and Jonathan Edwards draw. This view of mind, I conclude, is definitely not the bundle theory that some critics have portrayed it as being.
Keywords Berkeley  mind  spiritual substance  Stoic  Leibniz  Jonathan Edwards  bunlde theory  Ramist
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Can the Berkeleyan Idealist Resist Spinozist Panpsychism?Graham Clay & Michael Rauschenbach - forthcoming - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis:1-30.

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